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Abstract
In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-deﬁned sense in which
the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as
usually, on the probability but on the conﬁrmation of a coherent set and its members.
We show that, if evidence conﬁrms a hypothesis, conﬁrmation is “transmitted” to
any hypotheses that are suﬃciently coherent with the former hypothesis, according
to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s
measure. Our ﬁndings have implications for scientiﬁc methodology, as they provide a
formal rationale for the method of indirect conﬁrmation and the method of conﬁrming
theories by conﬁrming their parts.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many epistemologists ﬁnd it intuitive that coherence is truth-conducive. However,
it has not yet been possible to turn this plausible intuition into an exact claim without
facing serious objections or counterexamples. For instance, if the truth-conduciveness
of coherence is understood as the claim that more coherent sets of statements (pro-
positions, beliefs, scientiﬁc hypotheses, etc.) are always more likely to be true than
less coherent ones, the thesis is obviously false. For, “a well-composed novel is usually
not true, and yet it may still be highly coherent — perhaps far more so than reality in
itself.” (Olsson 2002, 247). The problem of truth-conduciveness of coherence has been
investigated in a long, open and on-going debate, by, among others, BonJour 1985,
Klein and Warﬁeld 1994 and 1996, Merricks 1995, Cross 1999, Shogenji 1999 and
2001, Akiba 2000, Olsson 2001 and 2002, Bovens et al. 2002, Bovens and Hartmann
2002, 2003 and 2004. Since the thesis “more coherent sets have higher probability”
is not true as such, the general strategy in the literature has been to argue that the
thesis becomes true once restricted to sets satisfying suitable conditions. However,
the nature and even existence of such conditions is highly controversial.
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach, by focusing not on the probability but on
the conﬁrmation of coherent sets. This will lead to a sense in which coherence is
truth-conducive, a sense that is less ambitious than the claim “coherence increases
1We wish to thank Claus Beisbart, Ludwig Fahrbach, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann, Franz
Huber, Erik Olsson, Tomoji Shogenji, and the referees of this journal, for helpful comments. We are
also grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research, and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government, for
supporting this research. Emails: franz.dietrich@uni-konstanz.de; luca.moretti@uni-konstanz.de.probability” but is mathematically well-deﬁned.2 We deﬁne a property, to be called
conﬁrmation transmission,t ot h ee ﬀect that, in short, if some evidence conﬁrms a
given hypothesis, and this hypothesis is suﬃciently coherent with other hypotheses,
then the evidence also conﬁrms these other hypotheses. While such conﬁrmation
transmission is intuitively plausible, we will give a formal analysis of it. Our truth-
conduciveness is thus a conditional one: coherence is truth-conducive conditional on
evidence conﬁrming a member of the set. Our ﬁndings establish a link between the
Bayesian theories of conﬁrmation and of coherence (for Bayesian conﬁrmation theory,
see for instance Eells and Fitelson 2000 and Fitelson 2001).
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne conﬁrmation transmission as a property of the degree of
coherence of sets as given by some probabilistic coherence measure (as opposed to
some absolute, i.e. ungraded, notion of coherence). Among the diﬀerent coherence
measures recently proposed in the literature, some but not all satisfy conﬁrmation
transmission. In particular, we prove that Olsson’s measure satisﬁes a strong form of
conﬁrmation transmission, Fitelson’s measure satisﬁes a weaker form of conﬁrmation
transmission, and Shogenji’s measure violates even the weaker property. We show that
if a coherence measure satisﬁes diﬀerent conﬁrmation transmission properties, then
coherence becomes in well-deﬁned ways truth-conducive and relevant for scientiﬁc
methodology. But we do not argue that our conﬁrmation transmission properties are
in all circumstances essential requirements on a coherence measure, since a measure
may be used for a diﬀerent purpose than conﬁrmation transmission.
In Section 2, we introduce the formal framework and the notion of a coherence
measure; and we deﬁne and discuss the coherence measures referred to in this paper.
In Section 3, we show that the coherence of a set of hypotheses (e.g. a theory) can
be used to ascertain the conﬁrmation of the set by evidence: if some element of a set
is conﬁrmed and the set is suﬃciently coherent, then conﬁrmation is ‘transmitted’
to the other members of the set, and to their conjunction. In Section 4, we show
that conﬁrmation transmission can be used to justify the method of indirect conﬁrm-
ation. In Section 5, we discuss a special case of the method of indirect conﬁrmation,
and we distinguish the method of indirect conﬁrmation from a relation of indirect
conﬁrmation. Section 6 contains the conclusions of the paper.
2 Probabilistic measures of coherence
Intuitively, a set of statements is coherent if its members ‘hang together’. For
instance, it seems coherent to claim that it’s summer and that it’s hot, but incoherent
to claim that it’s winter and that it’s hot. What notion of coherence underlies this
intuition? C. I. Lewis 1946 argued that a set is coherent in case each of its members
is (probabilistically) supported by the conjunction of all remaining members. Other
authors also emphasise that, unlike the notion of consistency, that of coherence is a
2We should mention that Bovens and Hartmann 2003 also identify a mathematically well-deﬁned,
yet somewhat diﬀerent and special sense of truth-conduciveness of coherence. They focus on inform-
ation sets, speciﬁcally on sets of hypotheses that have been conﬁrmed by independent and equally
(partially) reliable sources. They deﬁne a sophisticated partial coherence ordering over information
sets, and show that one information set is at least as probable as another if it is at least as coherent
as the other and in addition (i) both sets have equal size, (ii) the diﬀerent pieces of information come
from independent and equally reliable sources, and (iii) both sets had the same probability prior to
being reported by the sources (cf. p. 626).
2matter of degrees. While the (in)consistency of a set is a purely logical notion, the
(in)coherence of a set is often taken to depend on a state of uncertainty. Uncertainty
can be represented by probabilities.
Recently, a number of probabilistic coherence measures have been proposed, each
of which accounts for diﬀerent intuitions. A coherence measure is a function that
assigns to each (ﬁnite non-empty) set of statements a real number, interpreted as the
degree of coherence of that set. The proposed measures contrast with each other in
that they induce signiﬁcantly diﬀerent coherence orderings.
More precisely, consider a standard language of formal logic (with at least the
connectives ¬,∧,∨). Coherence measures are deﬁned relative to a given ﬁnitely ad-
ditive Kolmogorov probability function P on the language. A formula E is said to
(incrementally) conﬁrm af o r m u l aH i fa n do n l yi fP(E) > 0 and P(H|E) >P(H).
The probability measure P can be given diﬀerent interpretations, left largely open
by the literature on coherence. Although our mathematical results do not depend
on the particular interpretation of P, their epistemological relevance rests on the
assumption that P is not fully known to the agent. If P were fully known, the agent
would for instance not need to use the method of indirect conﬁrmation to ascertain
that an evidence E conﬁrms a hypothesis H: she could ﬁnd this out directly by
checking whether P(H|E) >P(H). By contrast, under our interpretation of P,t h e
agent may be at ﬁrst not aware that E conﬁrms H but aware that E conﬁrms some
hypothesis related to H, from which the agent might then infer that E also conﬁrms
H (“method of indirect conﬁrmation”).
A coherence measure is a function C that maps every non-empty ﬁnite set S of
formulae with positive probability to a number C(S) ∈ R.T h u sC : S → R,w h e r e
S is the set of all non-empty ﬁnite sets S of formulae H with P(H) > 0.3
To exemplify our conﬁrmation transmission properties, we focus on the coherence
measures proposed by, respectively, Shogenji 1999, Olsson 2002 and Fitelson 2004.
Let us now introduce these measures and brieﬂy discuss some of their advantages and
potential problems.





I nt h ec a s eo fab i n a r ys e tS = {H,H∗}, the coherence CS({H,H∗}) equals to
P(H∧H∗)




P(H∗) , the ratio-measure of the
support that H gives to H∗ and of the support that H∗ gives to H. So, for binary
sets, CS successfully captures the above-mentioned intuition by C. I. Lewis, which
connects coherence to mutual support. Shogenji obtains his measure by generalising
CS({H,H∗})=
P(H∧H∗)
P(H)P(H∗) to non-binary sets. His measure ranges over the interval
[0,∞). Shogenji interprets S as simply “coherent” if CS(S) > 1 and “incoherent” if
CS(S) < 1.I f S is inconsistent then CS(S)=0(minimal coherence). If S consists
of probabilistically independent formulae, CS(S)=1 . As pointed out by Bovens and
Hartmann (2004, p. 52), the Shogenji coherence of pairwise equivalent statements
can be lower than that of non-equivalent statements. This may appear unnatural. If
3Although some authors are not explicit about it, it is common to deﬁne the coherence C(S) only
for sets S whose members have positive probabilities. For instance, Shogenji’s measure is undeﬁned
otherwise.
3one wants to assign maximal coherence to sets of pairwise equivalent statements, one
may prefer Olsson’s measure.





The measure ranges over the interval [0,1]. While Shogenji’s measure interprets co-
herence as mutual support, Olsson’s measure interprets it as an agreement among
the statements in S. The agreement is considered as maximal in the case of pairwise
equivalent statements, as reﬂected by the maximal coherence of 1. The agreement is
considered as minimal if S is inconsistent, as reﬂected by the minimal coherence of
0. Since Olsson’s measure is not sensitive to mutual support, the coherence of two
positively dependent statements can be lower than that of two negatively dependent
statements. Another possibly undesirable feature is that the coherence of a set S
can never increase by adding a new statement, even if this statement “ﬁts” the other
statements well. Bovens and Hartmann (2004, p. 50) give the example of the set con-
taining the two statements “my pet Tweety is a bird” and “my pet Tweety cannot
ﬂy”. Intuitively, this set should become more coherent by adding the statement “my
pet Tweety is a penguin”.
• Fitelson deﬁnes the coherence of a set S ∈ S as the average degree to which
conjunctions of non-empty subsets S1 ⊆ S are supported by conjunctions of other







where R is the set of all pairs (S1,S 2) of non-empty subsets S1,S 2 ⊆ S with S1∩S2 = ∅
(there are exactly |R| = n(2n−1 −1) such pairs), and F is Kemeny and Oppenheim’s





interpreted as −1 if P(H)=0or P(K)=0 ,a n da s1 if P(¬H)=0and P(K) > 0.5






Fitelson’s measure ranges over the interval [−1,1]. If S consists of pairwise incon-
sistent formulae then CF(S)=−1 (minimal coherence). If S consists of pairwise
4If |S| =1we have R = ∅, so that the expression in (1) is undeﬁned. In this case we suggest
deﬁning CF({H}): =1 , in accordance with Fitelson’s aim that sets of pairwise equivalent (consistent)
formulae should have maximal coherence.
5More precisely, CF is what we consider to be a natural generalisation of Fitelson’s coherence
measure to our case of a possibly non-regular probability function P. CF generalises Fitelson’s revised
coherence measure, presented by him at the Bayesian Epistemology conference (London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK, 28 June 2004). The ﬁrst version of Fitelson’s measure is given
in Fitelson 2003.
4equivalent formulae then CF(S)=1(maximal coherence). If S consists of probabil-
istically independent formulae then CF(S)=0 . Like Shogenji’s coherence measure,
Fitelson’s aims to reﬂect the level of mutual support. It does so in a more ﬁne-grained
way than Shogenji’s, and is thus more sensitive to the relations between parts of S.
A potential disadvantage over Shogenji’s measure is that logically inconsistent sets
of statements may be assigned a higher coherence than logically consistent sets. For
further discussion, see again Bovens and Hartmann (2004, p. 51-53).
3C o n ﬁrming a theory by conﬁrming its parts
It is well-known that the conﬁrmation of individual members of a set of statements
does not entail conﬁrmation of the entire set, i.e. of the conjunction of its members.
In particular, if a theory is interpreted as a set of (scientiﬁc) hypotheses,6 and some
of the hypotheses are individually conﬁrmed, it does not in general follow that the
theory as a whole is conﬁrmed.
It is even easy to construct cases, within or outside science, in which evidence
conﬁrms each member of a set of statements yet disconﬁrms their conjunction. We
give two examples.
First, assume Anne has two lovers, Peter and Sam, who don’t know of each other.
Yesterday there was a party, and suppose that a meddlesome person’s theory says
that Peter and Sam both were at this party. Now, that person ﬁnds out that Anne
was at the party. This is evidence for both parts of the theory: it increases the
probability that Peter was at the party and increases the probability that Sam was at
the party. But it decreases the probability of the entire theory, because Anne would
never have gone to a party where both of her lovers are present.
Second, consider a physical experiment that involves two sources. Most likely,
none of the sources emits a particle in a certain period of time; but each source may,
with a small probability, emit either an electron or a positron in the period of time. A
physicist is interested in whether it is true that both sources emit an electron; so, she
wants to know whether the ﬁr s ts o u r c ee m i t sa ne l e c t r o n( H) and the second source
emits an electron (H∗). She observes two photons (E) indicating an annihilation.
Annihilation is possible only if the two sources do emit particles, but particles of
opposite charges (one emits an electron, the other a positron). Hence the observation
E conﬁrms H and conﬁrms H∗, yet disconﬁrms H ∧ H∗.
In general, are there conditions on a set S under which it is justiﬁed to consider
S as conﬁrmed by an evidence E that conﬁrms a member of S? We show that
suﬃciently high coherence of S is such a condition (not a necessary condition, of
course). But “suﬃciently high” with respect to which coherence measure C?T h e r e
are many plausible ways to measure coherence, but not for all of them the claim
“suﬃciently high coherence transmits conﬁrmation” holds. Below, we prove, as an
example, that the claim does hold for a particularly elementary coherence measure:
Olsson’s measure (deﬁned above).
We now deﬁne two properties, satisﬁed by some but not all coherence measures
6Sometimes, a theory is required to be closed under logical entailment (hence in particular inﬁnite).
Our present notion of a theory is that of a set of hypotheses or axioms (the deductive closure of which
is a theory in the above sense).
5C.7
Conﬁrmation Transmission (CT). For any formulae E,H such that E con-
ﬁrms H, there exists a (non-trivial8) coherence threshold c = cE,H ∈ R such that, for
any set S ∈ S containing H with coherence C(S) ≥ c, E conﬁrms each member of S.
Conﬁrmation Transmission to the Conjunction (CTC) For any formulae
E,H such that E conﬁrms H, there exists a (non-trivial8) coherence threshold c =
cE,H ∈ R such that, for any set S ∈ S containing H with coherence C(S) ≥ c (and
P(∧H∗∈SH∗) > 0), E conﬁrms the conjunction ∧H∗∈SH∗.
In this section, (CTC) is the main focus. A useful step towards proving that a
coherence measure satisﬁes (CTC) is to show ﬁr s tt h a ti ts a t i s ﬁes (CT). The reason
is given by the following result:
Theorem 1 Every coherence measure C satisfying (CT) and C(S ∪ {∧H∈SH}) ≥
C(S) for every S ∈ S with P(∧H∈SH) > 0 also satisﬁes (CTC) (and each possible
coherence threshold cE,H in (CT) is a possible coherence threshold cE,H in (CTC)).
Proof.A s s u m eC satisﬁes (CT) and the inequality C(S ∪ {∧H∈SH}) ≥ C(S) for
every S ∈ S with P(∧H∈SH) > 0.L e t E conﬁrm H,a n dl e tcE,H be as given in
( C T ) .T os h o w( C T C ) ,c o n s i d e ra n ys e tS ∈ S such that H ∈ S, P(∧H∗∈SH∗) > 0
and C(S) ≥ cE,H.H e n c eC(S∪{∧H∈SH}) ≥ C(S), and so C(S∪{∧H∈SH}) ≥ cE,H.
Hence, by (CT), E conﬁrms each member of S ∪ {∧H∈SH}, in particular ∧H∈SH.
This proves (CTC). ¥
We now apply Theorem 1 to Olsson’s coherence measure CO. As shown in the
appendix, CO satisﬁes (CT). Since CO also satisﬁes the inequalities in Theorem 1 (as
CO(S)=CO(S ∪{∧H∈SH}) for each S ∈ S with P(∧H∈SH) > 0), it follows that CO
satisﬁes (CTC):
Theorem 2 Olsson’s coherence measure CO satisﬁes (CT) and (CTC), with coher-
ence threshold in both cases given by cE,H = 1
1+P(E|H)−P(E).
7Each coherence measure C : S → R induces a coherence ordering º on S:as e tS ∈ S is at least
as coherent as another set S
∗ ∈ S (S º S
∗)j u s ti nc a s eC(S) ≥ C(S
∗). This coherence ordering
is reﬂexive, transitive and complete. However, one might argue that a “good” coherence ordering
º cannot be obtained in this way; rather, it should be an incomplete ordering, which refrains from
ranking certain pairs of sets S,S
∗ ∈ S. Bovens and Hartmann (2004, ch. 1) make such an argument
based on their impossibility theorem. Our conﬁrmation transmission properties (CT), (CTC) and
(CT
∗) can be restated in terms of a coherence ordering º rather than a coherence measure C.
This yields more general conditions, since º may be an incomplete ordering. For instance, (CT)
generalises into the following condition: for any formulae E,H such that E conﬁrms H, there exists
a (not maximally coherent) set TE,H ∈ S such that, for any set S ∈ S containing H with coherence
S º T, E conﬁrms each member of S.
8By “non-trivial” we mean that c<supS∈S s.t. H∈S C(S). This supremum equals supS∈S C(S)
(the maximal coherence level) if C is CS or CO or CF (and, generally, if C assigns maximal coherence
to any set of pairwise equivalent formulae).
6Note that the coherence threshold cE,H = 1
1+P(E|H)−P(E) is the higher, the less
dependent E and H are in the sense that P(E|H) − P(E) is smaller. As expected,
when P(E|H)−P(E) tends to 0 (independence), cE,H tends to 1 (maximal coherence).
To illustrate the importance of (CTC) for the conﬁrmation of sets, suppose that
S ∈ S is the set of points of the charge in a law suit. Each H ∈ S has been conﬁrmed
by some witness reports. Should one consider the whole charge ∧H∗∈SH∗ as conﬁrmed
by each witness report? This depends on how coherent the charge ∧H∗∈SH∗ is, as
measured by some coherence measure C satisfying (CTC) (for instance, Olsson’s
measure). More precisely, each witness report E conﬁrming a hypothesis H such that
C(S) ≥ cE,H also conﬁrms the entire charge ∧H∗∈SH∗; whereas each witness report
E conﬁrming a hypothesis H such that C(S) <c E,H may or may not conﬁrm the
entire charge ∧H∗∈SH∗.
Now consider a scientiﬁc theory represented by a set S of hypotheses. Assume
an evidence E is found for a particular member H of S. If the evidence is deductive,
i.e. if H logically entails E, then the conjunction ∧H∗∈SH∗ also entails E, hence E
also conﬁrms the conjunction ∧H∗∈SH∗. However, evidence is often not deductive in
science. If evidence is not deductive, it may be unclear whether or not conﬁrmation
is transmitted to the conjunction. In biology, low-level descriptive theories often
take the form of a collection of generalisations. Consider, for instance, a theory S
about shellﬁshes. S consists of only two hypotheses, H and H∗, where H is the
generalisation ∀x(Rx ⊃ Tx) and H∗ is the generalisation ∀x(Rx ⊃ T∗x). Here,
R,T, and T∗ are properties. R is the property of being a shellﬁsh from a particular
species, T is the property of having a particular digestive system, and T∗ is the
property of having a particular nervous system. Thus H states that every shellﬁsh
from the relevant species has the particular digestive system, and H∗ states that
every shellﬁsh from the relevant species has the particular nervous system. Assume
further that the evidence E consists of large amounts of a certain type of seaweed
regularly observed in regions inhabited by the relevant species of shellﬁsh, but not
observed elsewhere. Suppose ﬁnally that the digestion of such seaweed requires the
particular digestive system under consideration. Then it is plausible that E conﬁrms
H. However, it may be unclear how E relates to H∗ and H∧H∗: E could, for instance,
disconﬁrm H∗ and H ∧ H∗ in case the large amounts of seaweed are atypical for a
living environment of shellﬁsh with the particular nervous system. Does E conﬁrm
the conjunction H ∧H∗? As we have seen, we can deduce the conﬁrmation of H ∧H∗
if H and H∗ are suﬃciently coherent, as measured by a coherence measure satisfying
(CTC). Plausibly, whether the coherence threshold is exceeded depends on scientiﬁc
background knowledge about shellﬁshes, which is reﬂected in the probability function
P.
It should be emphasised, however, that a high enough coherence of a set S is
suﬃcient but not necessary for transmission of conﬁrmation from a member of S to
the conjunction of S. Indeed, if E conﬁrms H then E can also conﬁrm the conjunction
of a highly incoherent set S containing H. For instance, assume that S is very
incoherent and that H entails E.T h e n∧H∗∈SH∗ also entails E, hence is conﬁrmed
by E.
There is an interesting way to weaken the condition (CT) and (CTC) so that it
becomes satisﬁed by more coherence measures. The idea is to allow the coherence
threshold cE,H to depend on the size of the set S. For instance, the new condition
7(CT) is: for any formulae E,H such that E conﬁrms H, there exists to each number
n ∈ {1,2,...} a (non-trivial) coherence threshold c = cE,H,n ∈ R such that, for any
set S ∈ S of size n containing H with coherence C(S) ≥ c, E conﬁrms each member
of S. We conjecture that Fitelson’s measure CF, which violates (CT), satisﬁes the
modiﬁed condition (CT).
4 A rationale for the method of indirect conﬁrmation
While in the last section we focussed on the conﬁrmation of sets of hypotheses,
we now turn to the conﬁrmation of a single (scientiﬁc) hypothesis via indirect con-
ﬁrmation. This is a second sense in which conﬁrmation transmission is relevant to
scientiﬁc methodology.
It is a scientiﬁc practice to consider a hypothesis H∗ as conﬁrmed by evidence
E if E conﬁrms some other hypothesis H related to H∗.T h i si sc a l l e dt h em e t h o d
of indirect conﬁrmation (e.g. Laudan and Leplin 1991). The method is used in
cases where it is not immediately obvious that E conﬁrms H∗, but it is clear that E
conﬁrms H (for instance because E is a logical consequence of H, possibly together
with auxiliaries). As explained below, the method of indirect conﬁrmation was for
example used to argue that magnetic striping on ocean ﬂoors conﬁrms the climate
change hypothesis. The method of indirect conﬁrmation was also proposed as a way
to decide between empirically equivalent theories. Laudan and Leplin 1991 argue
that two empirically equivalent theories need not be empirically underdetermined,
as one of them may have more indirect support than the other (see also Hoefer and
Rosenberg 1994).
B u tw h a te x a c t l yd o e si tm e a nt h a tH and H∗ are “related”? Deﬁning “related”
in logical terms (either by H ² H∗ or by H∗ ² H) is inappropriate, since E can con-
ﬁrm H without conﬁrming H∗.9 Let us therefore interpret “related” as “suﬃciently
coherent”. This allows us to provide a formal justiﬁcation of the method of indirect
conﬁrmation: if E conﬁrms H and the coherence C({H,H∗}) is suﬃciently high,
where C is some coherence measure satisfying conﬁrmation transmission (CT), then
E conﬁrms H∗.
Note that this argument appeals to (CT) only in the special case of the binary
set S = {H,H∗}. So the argument remains true even if C does not satisfy (CT) but
only the following less demanding notion of conﬁrmation transmission:
Weak Conﬁrmation Transmission (CT∗). For any formulae E,H such that
E conﬁrms H, there exists a (non-trivial10) coherence threshold c = cE,H ∈ R such
that, for any formula H∗ with P(H∗) > 0 and coherence C({H,H∗}) ≥ c, E conﬁrms
H∗.
As our formal account of the method of indirect conﬁrmation requires not (CT)
but only (CT∗), it is open to more coherence measures, including Fitelson’s and
9The logical interpretation of "related" given by Laudan and Leplin 1991 leads into the Hempelian
paradox of conﬁrmation that everything conﬁrms everything, as shown by Okasha 1997.
10By “non-trivial” we mean that c<supH∗ s.t. P(H∗)>0 C({H,H
∗}). This supremum equals
supS∈S C(S) (the maximal coherence level) if C is CO or CF (or, more generally, if C assigns maximal
coherence to any set of pairwise equivalent formulae), but equals
1
P(H) if C is CS (see the proof of
Theorem 4).
8Olsson’s ones:
Theorem 3 Fitelson’s and Olsson’s coherence measures both satisfy (CT∗), with
coherence threshold given by, respectively, cE,H = 1
1+P(E∧H)−P(E)P(H) and cE,H =
1
1+P(E|H)−P(E).
(The proof is in the appendix, where we also show that Fitelson’s measure does
not satisfy (CT).) Our earlier comments on the threshold for Olsson’s measure apply
similarly to the threshold of Fitelson’s measure: it is the larger, the nearer E and
H are to being independent (in the sense that P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H) is smaller),
and it tends to 1 (maximal coherence) as P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H) tends to 0 (full
independence).
Interestingly, the coherence threshold cE,H given for Fitelson’s measure is strictly
higher than that given for Olsson’s measure, because
1







(by P(H) < 1).
The coherence threshold cE,H to a given coherence measure C is of course not unique:
if (CT∗)i ss a t i s ﬁed with a particular threshold cE,H, it is also satisﬁed with any
(non-trivial) higher threshold. So, the threshold given for Fitelson’s measure is also
a valid threshold for Olsson’s measure. However, there is a general interest in using
a small threshold among the various valid thresholds, so as to capture more cases of
conﬁrmation transmission.
Shogenji’s coherence measure CS, however, does not satisfy (CT∗), and hence CS
cannot be used to formalise the method of indirect conﬁrmation.
Theorem 4 Shogenji’s coherence measure CS does not satisfy (CT∗) (provided that
t h e r ee x i s tt h r e ep a i r w i s ei n c o n s i s t e n t formulae with positive probabilities11).
(The proof is in the appendix.)
Let us give a historical example of indirect conﬁrmation. The so-called continental
drift theory (H) states, roughly, that the Earth’s surface is composed by a number of
oceanic and continental plates that move in time as they ﬂoat on top of the astheno-
sphere. The theory was not accepted until the 1960s, when it was strongly conﬁrmed
by the systematic observation of magnetic striping on ocean ﬂoors (E). Brieﬂy, on
both sides of mid-ocean ridges, wide stripes of magmatic rock with alternating po-
larity were observed. It was already established by then that the Earth’s magnetic
polarity reversed at certain geologic times and that, as new magma wells up out of a
rift, it gets magnetised in the direction of the Earth’s magnetic polarity at that time.
So, magnetic striping was interpreted as providing a record of a spreading movement
of the ocean ﬂoor over time: a conﬁrmation of the continental drift theory.
The continental drift theory is coherent with the climate change hypothesis (H∗)
whereby the climate of continents has varied throughout geologic time. H∗ was a
11This condition excludes degenerate probability functions P, for instance probability function that
only assign probabilities of 1 or 0. The three formulae could be A∧B, A∧¬B and ¬A, where A and
B are two atomic formulae.
9plausible but little conﬁrmed hypothesis before the 1960s. The discovery of magnetic
striping was taken to conﬁrm the climate change hypothesis. As argued in Laudan
and Leplin 1991, this was a case of indirect conﬁrmation: E conﬁrms H∗ as H∗ is
closely related with H,w h i c hi sc o n ﬁrmed by E.12 A formal explanation that E
indeed conﬁrms H∗ would be that E conﬁrms H and C({H,H∗}) ≥ cE,H for some
coherence measure C satisfying (CT∗) (for instance, Olsson’s or Fitelson’s but not
Shogenji’s measure).
Let us be more concrete. Suppose ﬁrst that we use Olsson’s coherence measure.
We assume that P(E|H)=.9 (given the truth of the continental drift theory, mag-
netic striping on the ocean ﬂoors is very probable), and that P(E)=.3 (magnetic
striping is much less probable unconditionally, i.e. without knowing in the 1960s












So, to ascertain that E also conﬁrms the climate change hypothesis H∗,i ti ss u ﬃcient
to verify that CO({H,H∗})=
P(H∧H∗)
P(H∨H∗) ≥ .625.
Now assume we use Fitelson’s coherence measure. In addition to our assumptions
on P(E|H) and P(E), suppose that P(H)=.2 (the continental drift theory was
little probably in the 1960s without having observed any magnetic striping). Then
the coherence threshold for Fitelson’s measure is given by
cE,H =
1








So, to ascertain that E also conﬁrms the climate change hypothesis H∗,i ti ss u ﬃcient
to verify that CF({H,H∗}) exceeds this threshold.
5T h e m e t h o d o f i n d i r e c t c o n ﬁrmation versus a relation
of indirect conﬁrmation
It is worth discussing a special case in which the condition for conﬁrmation trans-
mission is particularly simple — a case to which Shogenji and one referee drew our
attention. Assume that H (the hypothesis conﬁrmed by E) screens oﬀ E from H∗.
That is, E and H∗ are probabilistically independent conditional on H and also con-
ditional on ¬H:
P(E ∧ H∗|H)=P(E|H)P(H∗|H) and P(E ∧ H∗|¬H)=P(E|¬H)P(H∗|¬H). (2)
This screening oﬀ relation is often assumed to hold if E is related to H∗ only through
H.13 Figure 1 shows three examples of such relations, represented by directed acyclic
graphs, whose nodes contain variables (events) such as H,E,H∗. Usually, each arrow
is given a causal interpretation and indicates a (probabilistic) eﬀect of a variable on
another.
12In fact, Laudan and Leplin provide a slightly diﬀerent reconstruction of this case.
13With this we mean, formally, that H d-separates E from H
∗ in a graph (see Pearl 2001). For










Figure 1: Three causal networks in which E is indirectly related to H∗ through H.
In the ﬁrst graph, H aﬀects E and H∗;t h ee ﬀect on E is positive because
P(E|H) >P (E),a n dt h ee ﬀect on H∗ may or may not be positive. In the second
graph, H∗ aﬀects H,w h i c ha ﬀects E. In the third graph, H∗ aﬀects H directly as
well as indirectly through J,a n dH aﬀects E.
For instance, Bovens and Hartmann (2004, ch. 4) analyse cases of conﬁrmation by
using graphs similar to the second one in Figure 1. One may interpret their procedure
as indirect conﬁrmation.
Shogenji 2003 proves an important result about the transitivity of conﬁrmation in
t h ec a s eo fs c r e e n i n go ﬀ. This result can be stated as follows. According to Shogenji,
as e tS ∈ S is “coherent” if CS(S) > 1; so, a binary set S = {H,H∗} is (Shogenji-
)coherent just in case H and H∗ are positively dependent (P(H∧H∗) >P(H)P(H∗)),
i.e. if the two hypotheses conﬁrm each other.
Theorem 5 If E conﬁrms H and H screens oﬀ E from H∗, then E also conﬁrms
H∗ i fa n do n l yi fH and H∗ are (Shogenji-)coherent.
Interestingly, while Shogenji’s coherence measure CS fails to satisfy our conﬁrma-
tion transmission properties (CT), (CTC), (CT∗), by Theorem 5 Shogenji coherence
transmits conﬁrmation in the case of screening oﬀ.S o , i f w e m o d i f y ( C T ∗)b yr e -
stricting the quantiﬁcation over H∗ to hypotheses that are screened oﬀ from E by H,
then Shogenji’s coherence measure CS does satisfy the modiﬁed (CT∗) with coherence
threshold cE,H =1 . Moreover, the (Shogenji-)coherence of H and H∗ is not only a
suﬃcient, but also a necessary condition for conﬁrmation transmission.
In a private communication, Shogenji suggested that the notion of indirect con-
ﬁrmation requires that E gives “no direct evidential support” to H∗, such as in Figure
1. This is certainly a plausible requirement to deﬁne a relation of indirect conﬁrma-
tion. By contrast, we have focused on the method of indirect conﬁrmation, or more
explicitly the method of ascertaining indirectly that E conﬁrms H∗ — a purely epi-
stemological concept.14 What is indirect here is not the actual relation between E
14A relation of indirect conﬁrmation cannot be extracted from the probability function P alone.
The additional structure to deﬁne a relation of indirect conﬁrmation could be a graph connecting
formulae of the language, such as E,H,H
∗. One could then deﬁne E to “indirectly conﬁrm” H
∗ if
and only if E conﬁrms H
∗ and E and H
∗ are not connected by an arrow. By contrast, the following
purely probabilistic deﬁnition, which does not require a graph, seems problematic. Suppose that we
deﬁne E to conﬁrm H
∗ indirectly if there exists an H such that E conﬁrms H, H conﬁrms H
∗,a n d
H screens oﬀ E from H
∗. The problem is that this deﬁnition is compatible with many situations in
which E and H
∗ stand in a direct causal relation. Consider a situation in which H
∗ has both direct
and indirect eﬀects on E: H
∗ h a sad i r e c te ﬀect on E,a n dh a se ﬀects on other (“intermediate”)
events H,H
0,H
00,...,each of which has an eﬀect on E. Each of these various eﬀects can be positive
or negative. Now it may happen that the intermediate event H screens oﬀ E from H
∗ (i.e. (2) holds),
11and H∗ but our method of ascertaining that E conﬁrms H∗. The method of indir-
ect conﬁrmation is not restricted to cases in which E is causally related to H∗ only
through H; it is open to the frequent cases in which H does not screen oﬀ E from
H∗. This includes cases in which H and/or H∗ are not events but (scientiﬁc) laws
or axioms of a theory. In such cases, it seems less natural to assume H screens oﬀ E
from H∗, because graphs such as those in Figure 1 are usually introduced to model
causal eﬀects between events.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The literature about coherence is far from an agreement on how to measure the
coherence of a set (of statements, scientiﬁc hypotheses etc.). One of the reasons
is that the role of coherence is controversial. Despite attempts to argue that the
coherence of a set can, under suitable conditions, imply that the set is probable, none
of the coherence measures in the literature reﬂects this claim in any straightforward
and general way. In this paper, we have shown that, in the diﬀerent context of the
conﬁrmation of hypotheses, coherence can be given a simple and mathematically well-
deﬁned signiﬁcance, which is reﬂected in some of the coherence measures proposed
so far, and probably in many other ones that have still to be stated. Speciﬁcally, we
introduce three notions of conﬁrmation transmission, (CT), (CTC) and (CT∗), and
show that Olsson’s measure satisﬁes all of them, Fitelson’s measure satisﬁes (CT∗),
whereas Shogenji’s measure violates all three conditions. Satisfaction or violation of
our conditions is not a reason to accept or reject a coherence measure in general.
Indeed, if the purpose is not conﬁrmation transmission, one may prefer Shogenji’s
and Fitelson’s measures over Olsson’s measure, for instance on the grounds that they
always assign a higher coherence to a positively dependent set than to an independent
set (see Fitelson 2003).
The relevance of our conﬁrmation transmission properties for scientiﬁc methodo-
logy is that they provide formal rationales for two standard procedures: the method
of conﬁr m i n gat h e o r yb yc o n ﬁrming its parts, and the method of indirect conﬁrma-
tion. Indeed, if coherence is deﬁned in accordance with (CTC), evidence conﬁrming a
part of a suﬃciently coherent theory also conﬁrms the theory as a whole. Moreover,
if coherence is deﬁned in accordance with (CT∗), evidence conﬁrming a hypothesis
suﬃciently coherent with another hypothesis also conﬁrms the latter hypothesis.
7 Appendix: proof of the theorems
Proof of Theorem 2. We need only show the claim relating to (CT), as this claim
implies the one relating to (CTC) by using Theorem 1.
Let E and H b ea n yf o r m u l a es u c ht h a tE conﬁrms H, i.e. P(H|E)−P(H) > 0.
Put c := 1
1+P(E|H)−P(E). Consider any set S ∈ S such that H ∈ S and CO(S) ≥ c.
We have to show that E conﬁrms each member H∗ ∈ S.I fH∗ = H, then E conﬁrms
because, conditional on H (or on ¬H)t h ed i ﬀerent other positive and negative eﬀects cancel out
each other. If moreover E conﬁrms H and H conﬁrms H
∗, then, according to the above deﬁnition,
E would conﬁrm H
∗ indirectly,d e s p i t et h ed i r e c te ﬀect of H
∗ on E.
12H∗ by assumption. Now assume H∗ ∈ S\{H}. We show that
D∗ := P(H∗|E) − P(H∗) > 0.
1. We begin by proving an inequality. By the deﬁnition of CO,C O({H,H∗}) ≥






=1+P(E|H) − P(E).( 3 )































Now using the inequality (3),w eo b t a i n
P(K) ≤ P(H)[1+P(E|H) − P(E) − 1] = P(H)[P(E|H) − P(E)],
and hence
P(K) ≤ P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H). (4)
2. We next show that D∗ ≥ 0 (the proof of D∗ > 0 follows in part 3.) As indicated
in Figure 2, we deﬁne
a := P(E ∧ H ∧ ¬H∗),b := P(¬E ∧ H ∧ ¬H∗),








Figure 2: The sets of worlds corresponding to E,H,H∗ (the probabilities of certain
regions are indicated in brackets)
With this notation in place, we can write















− [P(H)+a∗ + b∗ − a − b]
= P(H|E) − a/P(E) − [P(H)+b∗]+a + b + a∗(1/P(E) − 1)
≥ P(H|E) − a/P(E) − [P(H)+b∗]. (5)
To prove that D∗ ≥ 0 it is thus suﬃcient to show that the last expression is non-
negative, i.e. that
P(H|E) − a/P(E) ≥ P(H)+b∗,o rQ :=
P(H|E) − a/P(E)
P(H)+b∗ ≥ 1.




P(E ∧ H) − a
P(H)+b∗ . (6)
Note that
a ≤ (a + a∗ + b + b∗) − b∗ = P(K) − b∗,
with K as deﬁned above. So, by (4),
a ≤ P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H) − b∗. (7)
















3. We ﬁnally show that D∗ > 0.T od e r i v eD∗ > 0, it is suﬃcient to show that
one of the weak inequalities used in the proof of D∗ ≥ 0 (see parts 1 and 2) holds in
fact in the strict sense. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: a = b = a∗ = b∗ =0 . Then the inequality (4) holds in the strict sense, as
P(K)=a + b + a∗ + b∗ =0and P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H) > 0 (since E conﬁrms H).
Case 2: b∗ > 0. Then the inequality in (8) holds in the strict sense.
Case 3: a>0 or b>0 or a∗ > 0. Then the inequality in (5) holds in the strict
sense. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3. The claim about Olsson’s measure CO follows from Theorem
1, because (CT) implies (CT∗). To show that Fitelson’s measure CF satisﬁes (CT∗)
with the claimed threshold, consider any formulae E and H such that E conﬁrms H,
and put c := 1
1+P(E∧H)−P(E)P(H). Further, consider any formula H∗ with P(H∗) > 0
such that CF({H,H∗}) ≥ c.W eh a v et os h o wt h a tE also conﬁrms H∗.W ed e r i v e
the following inequality analogous to (4):
P(K) ≤ P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H), (9)
where K is again deﬁned as (H ∧¬H∗) ∨(¬H ∧H∗). This inequality implies that E






We have P(H∗) < 1,s i n c eo t h e r w i s eCF({H,H∗})=1
2 [0 + 1] = 1
2, violating CF({H,H∗}) ≥





































(1 − α)(1 + β)+( 1+α)(1 − β)






1 − α + β − αβ +1+α − β − αβ




















≥ P(H∗ ∧ ¬H) and β =
P(H ∧ ¬H∗)
P(¬H∗)
≥ P(H ∧ ¬H∗),
we have










1+P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H)
.
Taking inverses, we obtain
1+P(K) ≤ 1+P(E ∧ H) − P(E)P(H),
which implies (9), as desired. ¥
Sketched proof that CF violates (CT).T os e ew h yCF violates (CT) (if the language
contains three pairwise inconsistent formulae E,F,G with positive probabilities), let
E conﬁrm H but not conﬁrm H∗, where P(H ∧ H∗) > 0 (such E,H,H∗ exist by
assumption on the language). Suppose for contradiction that there is a (non-trivial)
threshold cE,H such that, for all sets S ∈ S,i fH ∈ S and C(S) ≥ cE,H then E con-
ﬁrms each member of S.L e tH1,H∗
1,H 2,H∗
2,H 3,H∗
3,...be distinct formulae such that
each of H1,H 2,H 3,...is equivalent to H a n de a c ho fH∗
1,H∗
2,H∗
3,...is equivalent to H∗.
15For each n ∈ {1,2,...} consider the set Sn := {H,H∗,H 1,H∗
1,...,H n,H∗
n}. By deﬁni-
tion of CF,C F(Sn) is the average of all terms of the form F(∧K1∈S1K1,∧K2∈S2K2),
where (S1,S 2) ranges over Mn, the set of pairs of disjoint non-empty subsets of
Sn. Note that, depending on S1, ∧K1∈S1K1 is equivalent either to H, or to H∗, or
to H ∧ H∗; similarly, depending on S2, ∧K2∈S2K2 is equivalent either to H, or to
H∗, or to H ∧ H∗. One easily veriﬁes that, as n increases, the proportion of pairs
(S1,S 2) in Mn for which ∧K1∈S1K1 and ∧K2∈S2K2 are each equivalent to H ∧ H∗
tends to 1 as n tends to inﬁnity. So the proportion of pairs (S1,S 2) in Mn for which
F(∧K1∈S1K1,∧K2∈S2K2)=1tends to 1 as n tends to inﬁnity. It follows that CF(Sn)
tends to 1 as n tends to inﬁnity. Therefore, by cE,H < 1, CF(Sn) ≥ cE,H for suﬃ-
ciently large n,.Y e tE does not conﬁrm all members of Sn since E does not conﬁrm
H∗. ¥
Proof of Theorem 4. By assumption, there exist three pairwise inconsistent for-
mulae E,F,G with positive probabilities. Deﬁne H to be the formula E ∨ F.T h e n
E conﬁrms H. For a contradiction, assume that CS satisﬁes (CT∗), and let c = cE,H








where the last equality holds because CS({H,H∗})=
P(H∧H∗)
P(H)P(H∗) is at most 1
P(H), and
exactly 1











Using (11), it follows that CS({H,F}) >c .S o , b y ( C T ∗), E conﬁrms also F.B u t
this is false since E is inconsistent with F. ¥
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